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ADMISSIBILITY OF BATTERED-
SPOUSE-SYNDROME EVIDENCE IN 
ALASKA 
Morgan Abbott* 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the exceptionally high rates of domestic violence in Alaska, Alaskan 
jurisprudence affords battered women varied and sparse guidance for the use 
of their experience as a battered woman in criminal trials. Of the minimal 
guidance offered, none arises in the form of a binding Alaska Supreme Court 
opinion, rule of evidence, or governing statute. As one of the few states 
lacking established jurisprudence on evidence of battered spouse syndrome, 
Alaska would benefit from a clearer rule regarding the admissibility of 
battered-spouse-syndrome evidence. This rule would interpret 
“reasonableness” to include a “reasonable battered woman” standard when 
the relevant party was battered and claims a related altered perception or 
extreme emotional disturbance colored her actions. Under this standard, the 
consequences of the battering inform and define the reasonable person against 
whom the battered woman is judged. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over one-third of women in the United States experience domestic 
violence at the hands of an intimate partner.1 In Alaska, this statistic is 
even higher: approximately half of the women in Alaska suffer domestic 
violence from an intimate partner during their lifetimes.2 Indeed, Alaska 
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 1.   Nat’l Ctr. for Injury Prevention & Control, Div. of Violence Prevention, 
National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey 2010 Summary Report, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 2 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/ 
violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf. 
 2.  Facts & Statistics, ALASKA NETWORK ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & SEXUAL 
ASSAULT, http://www.andvsa.org/facts/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
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ranks first in the United States for intimate partner homicide.3 However, 
out of the 220 rural communities in Alaska, only one has a shelter for 
domestic violence victims.4 Alaska Native women are especially 
vulnerable—although they make up less than twenty percent of the 
state’s overall population, they represent nearly half of all reported rape 
victims.5 And until very recently, the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA)6 excluded Alaska Native tribes from provisions specifically 
designed to expand tribal jurisdiction over domestic violence crimes, 
leaving many Alaska Native women without recourse if they were 
assaulted.7 
Despite their prevalence, sexual assault and domestic violence are 
two of the most underreported violent crimes due to fear, shame, loyalty 
to family members, and intimate relations with the perpetrator.8 
Furthermore, it is difficult to prosecute domestic violence crimes, even 
those that are actually reported, because the offense often intertwines 
with familial or emotional relationships.9 Victims may hesitate to testify 
due to shame or fear, and the fact that physical evidence is infrequently 
documented often results in the case becoming a “he said—she said” 
argument.10 
Notwithstanding the high rates of intimate partner abuse in Alaska, 
 
 3.   Council on Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault, Intimate Partner 
Violence and Sexual Violence in the State of Alaska: Key Results from the 2010 Alaska 
Victimization Survey, UAA JUST. CENTER (2010), http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/ 
research/2010/1004.avs_2010/1004.07a.statewide_summary.pdf. 
 4.  Indian Law and Order Comm’n, A Roadmap for Making Native America 
Safer: Report to the President and Congress of the United States, UCLA AM. INDIAN 
STUDS. CENTER ch. 2, at 41 (Nov. 2013), http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  The Violence Against Women Act was originally passed as Title IV of 
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 
108 Stat. 1796. The 2013 revisions were passed as the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54. 
 7.  See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2265(e) note (West 2013) (“In the State of Alaska, the amendments made by 
sections 904 and 905 [which recognize civil domestic violence jurisdiction over 
‘any person’] shall apply only to the Indian country . . . of the Metlakatla Indian 
Community, Annette Island Reserve.”); Repeal of Special Rule for State of 
Alaska, Pub. L. No. 113-275, 127 Stat. 2988 (2014) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
2265), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ275/pdf/ 
PLAW-113publ275.pdf (repealing this provision). 
 8.  See Irene Hanson Frieze & Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage, 11 
CRIME & JUST. 163, 172, 186–90 (1989) (discussing underreporting of spousal 
abuse and marital rape). 
 9.  Michelle Byers, What Are the Odds: Applying the Doctrine of Chances to 
Domestic-Violence Prosecutions in Massachusetts, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 551, 551 
(2012). 
 10.  Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and 
Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367–71 (1996). 
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courts have said little about the role of domestic violence evidence in 
supporting affirmative criminal defenses, including self-defense claims, 
in the state. These defenses would allow defendants accused of 
homicide to receive a lesser punishment upon showing that they were 
battered by the murder victim. Additionally, Alaska has no binding 
precedent, statutes, or rules of evidence governing the admissibility of 
evidence of battered spouse syndrome or other evidence of domestic 
violence.11 This needs to change. 
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of the battered 
spouse syndrome framework and describes its functions and roles in 
criminal cases. Part II details the development of battered-spouse-
syndrome jurisprudence in Alaska. Finally, Part III proposes a 
framework for allowing Alaskans to admit battered-spouse-syndrome 
evidence in criminal trials. 
I. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENCE OF BATTERED 
SPOUSE SYNDROM 
Battered spouse syndrome, also referred to as battered wife 
syndrome or battered woman’s syndrome, is the physical and 
psychological condition of a person subject to repeated forceful, 
physical, or psychological abusive behavior by an intimate partner.12 
Battered spouse syndrome has been identified as a sub-category of post-
traumatic stress disorder.13 Courts began recognizing the relevance of 
battered-spouse-syndrome evidence in criminal prosecutions in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.14 Evidence of battered spouse syndrome, with or 
without an official diagnosis, can explain the presence of a series of traits 
and characteristics that are common to women who have been 
physically or emotionally abused by dominant male figures over a 
prolonged time period.15 
 
 11.  Cynthia Lynn Barnes, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
Concerning Domestic-Violence Syndromes to Assist Jury in Evaluating Victim’s 
Testimony or Behavior, 57 A.L.R. 5th 315 § 1(a) (1998). 
 12.  Mira Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, 
Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253, 1258 (1987). 
 13.  See, e.g., State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165, 1169 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) 
(describing expert testimony that battered woman’s syndrome is a subgroup of 
post-traumatic stress syndrome). 
 14.  See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 639 (D.C. 1979) 
(considering the application of testimony similar to battered spouse syndrome to 
a homicide case and concluding that the evidence was admissible to 
demonstrate that the defendant’s behavior may have been similar to traits 
shown by other battered women). 
 15.  People v. Ellis, 650 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (Sup. Ct. 1997). 
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According to experts, a relationship in which an individual suffers 
from battered spouse syndrome cycles between three phases. In the 
first—the tension-building stage—minor domestic violence episodes 
transpire.16 The second stage is characterized by violent, uncontrollable, 
or brutal abuse.17 Following that abuse, in the final stage, the batterer 
asks for forgiveness, demonstrates loving and caring behavior, and 
promises that the abuse will not reoccur.18 Couples then reconcile, but 
the cycle begins anew.19 
A. The General Role of Evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome in 
Criminal Cases 
Battered spouse syndrome is not a stand-alone defense to a 
criminal charge and does not automatically compel acquittal. Instead, 
the battered defendant introduces evidence of her syndrome in support 
of another recognized defense,20 as a characteristic of the relevant 
reasonable person standard, or to demonstrate her mental state at the 
time of the alleged offense.21 
Evidence of battered spouse syndrome does not remove any 
question of fact from the jury because, in most jurisdictions, the expert 
does not testify specifically as to whether the particular defendant 
demonstrates characteristics of battered spouse syndrome. Rather, the 
expert assists in dispelling an ordinary layperson-juror’s perception that 
a woman in a battering relationship can leave at any time.22 Because the 
average layperson-juror has a minimal understanding of the conduct of 
a woman in an abusive or domestic violence situation, expert testimony 
assists the jury in establishing the proper framework with which to 
decide its questions of fact.23 Courts have often admitted expert 
testimony explaining the nature and effect of battered spouse syndrome, 
just as expert testimony is admissible to explain the mental state of 
hostages, prisoners of war, and other long-term, life-threatening 
 
 16.  State v. Bednarz, 507 N.W.2d 168, 170 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19. See id. (explaining that the victim feels needed and may even change her 
story to exonerate her batterer). 
 20.  See Jeffrey Robinson, Note, Defense Strategies for Battered Women Who 
Assault Their Mates: State v. Curry, 4 HARVARD WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 162 (1981) 
(recognizing the use of battered spouse syndrome as evidence rather than as a 
defense itself). 
 21.  Jimmy E. Tinsley, Criminal Law: The Battered Woman Defense, 34 AM. JUR. 
2D Proof of Facts § 3 (1983). 
 22.  People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1087 (Cal. 1996). 
 23.  Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 
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conditions.24 
B. Admissibility of Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence: When is it 
Allowed? 
There are four main circumstances in which courts have historically 
permitted defendants to introduce evidence of battered spouse 
syndrome: claims of self-defense, claims of provocation, mitigation of 
sentencing, and appeals claiming ineffective counsel. Each of these is 
discussed in greater detail below. 
1. Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence and its Role in Self-Defense 
Claims: The Reasonableness of the Defendant’s Perception of 
Danger, Imminence, and Options 
 
Battered women may offer expert testimony regarding battered 
spouse syndrome to support a defense of insanity, diminished capacity, 
heat of passion, or duress.25 Defendants most commonly, however, offer 
battered-spouse-syndrome evidence to support a self-defense claim.26 
An individual may justifiably use deadly force in self-defense against 
another if she reasonably believes that she was in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily harm at the hands of an attacker.27 A majority of 
United States jurisdictions judge defendants using the standard of a 
reasonable person in the person’s situation, but the nuances of this 
standard vary.28 
Defendants face several problems of proof in establishing self-
defense using evidence of battered spouse syndrome. Most notably, 
defendants must demonstrate why they perceived imminent danger in a 
situation where a non-battered person may not believe the danger to be 
imminent.29 This requires breaking down the layperson-jurors’ 
 
 24.  State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985). 
 25.  Tinsley, supra note 21, at §§ 3, 4.5. 
 26.  Id. at § 3. 
 27.  John F. Wagner Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination of 
Reasonableness of Criminal Defendant’s Belief, for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, that 
Physical Force Is Necessary—Modern Cases, 73 A.L.R. 4th 993 § 2 (1989). 
 28.  See, e.g., People v. Maggio, 70 A.D.3d 1258, 1258–60 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2010) (viewing forcible compulsion through the “state of mind produced in the 
victim by the defendant’s conduct” while also considering numerous other 
factors, including the victim’s age, the sizes and strengths of defendant and 
victim, and the defendant’s relationship with the victim); but cf. People v. 
Romero, No. B170885, 2006 WL 2808132, at *27–31 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2006) 
(holding that cultural factors that shape defendant’s perceptions relevant to his 
situation are not permissible at trial). 
 29.  Tinsley, supra note 21, at § 4. 
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previously held stereotypes or misconceptions about domestic violence. 
Defendants establish this imminence factor by demonstrating that 
battered women become sensitive to indicators of forthcoming violence 
by their batterers.30 As a result, while perhaps not subject to an 
immediate threat of harm at the exact moment she used force, the 
defendant knew, by virtue of her intimate partner’s past violent acts, 
that violence was approaching.31 If she waited until the violence began, 
it may be too late to defend herself.32 
This problem of proof is exacerbated when the defendant kills her 
intimate partner from behind, or while he is asleep. It is difficult for a 
jury to understand how there could have been an imminent threat of 
death or great bodily harm to the defendant when her batterer was 
resting. Some states preclude using evidence of battered spouse 
syndrome to support a self-defense claim when the defendant kills or 
assaults a sleeping or resting intimate partner.33 In states that allow such 
evidence, the defendant must explain to the jury how her status as a 
battered woman influenced her perceptions of imminent danger and the 
need to use deadly force.34 
Unlike typical self-defense cases, defense experts offering evidence 
of battered spouse syndrome emphasize past occurrences as the lens 
through which to interpret the details surrounding the alleged crime. 
Individuals suffering from battered spouse syndrome may genuinely 
and reasonably believe that they are in imminent danger, justifying the 
use of deadly force, in scenarios and circumstances where a non-
battered person would not hold that same belief. In light of this, battered 
defendants may offer expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome to 
explain the defendant’s perception that use of deadly force was justified 
and reasonable in light of the circumstances.35 For example, experts may 
explain that the cyclical nature of a relationship characterized by 
domestic violence allows a battered woman to anticipate an oncoming 
escalation of violence, demonstrating the reasonableness of her fear and 
belief in the immediacy of the danger.36 In homicide cases, the defendant 
may introduce evidence establishing the nature of the battering 
relationship to support the conclusion that she reasonably perceived 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  For example, North Carolina precludes evidence of battered spouse 
syndrome when the defendant assaults a sleeping intimate partner. State v. 
Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 266 (N.C. 1989). 
 34.  Tinsley, supra note 21, at § 4. 
 35.  Id. at § 3. 
 36.  See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 650 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (Sup. Ct. 1996). 
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imminent danger requiring the use of deadly force.37 Expert testimony 
can also detail the similarities between the circumstances preceding the 
prior instances of domestic violence and the specific assault or homicide 
in question.38 Thus, the expert assists the jury in understanding why the 
defendant perceived imminent danger under circumstances that may 
not have suggested danger to the average non-battered individual.39 
Furthermore, expert testimony portrays the defendant to the jury as 
someone facing guaranteed future injury and reasonably perceived no 
other means of defending herself.40 This perception may stem from prior 
fruitless attempts to obtain police assistance, a previous inability to 
defend herself against her batterer, or earlier unsuccessful attempts to 
leave her home.41 Thus, from the defendants’ perspective, no alternative 
way of preventing harm to herself existed other than seriously injuring 
or killing her intimate partner.42 To demonstrate that the theoretical 
option of leaving was unrealistic, defendants may offer evidence or 
testimony providing her reasons for staying in the relationship.43 These 
reasons may include her children, financial concerns, or her batterer’s 
forcible prevention of her previous attempts to leave.44 
2. Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence Admitted to Explain 
Provocation and the Defendant’s State of Mind 
 
Many jurisdictions permit evidence of battered spouse syndrome to 
be admitted to provide a reasonable explanation for the defendant’s 
provocation in murder prosecutions.45 These courts recognize that a 
person may have reason to assault or kill her persistent abuser, even 
despite the absence of a contemporaneous provocation that the average 
layperson would find suggestive of an imminent threat of death or 
serious bodily harm.46 Thus, where evidence of the victim-batterer’s 
prior physical abuse of the defendant exists, juries may base a finding of 
provocation on a course of abusive treatment which “can induce a 
homicidal response to a person of ordinary firmness and which the 
 
 37.  Tinsley, supra note 21, at § 3. 
 38.  Donald L. Creach, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered 
Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REV. 615, 618 (1982). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Tinsley, supra note 21, at § 5. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the 
Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 623, 640, 644–45 (1980). 
 44.  Id. at 626–27. 
 45.  Brooks v. State, 630 So. 2d 160, 163 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). 
 46.  State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 440 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
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accused reasonably believes is likely to continue.”47 In determining 
whether the defendant acted in the heat of passion resulting from 
reasonable provocation, the jury may consider testimony related to 
battered spouse syndrome.48 The jury may consider not only the 
decedent’s conduct at the time of the alleged offense, but also his prior 
abuse of the defendant.49 
3. Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence as a Mitigating Circumstance 
for Sentencing 
 
In some jurisdictions, defendants offer evidence of battered spouse 
syndrome as a mitigating circumstance during sentencing. For example, 
in People v. Johnson,50 New York’s intermediate appellate court reduced 
the defendant’s sentence from six-to-eighteen years of imprisonment to 
four-to-twelve years of imprisonment due to the defendant’s diagnosis 
as a battered woman.51 Additionally, in United States v. Whitetail,52 the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred when 
it concluded that the sentencing guidelines foreclosed consideration of 
battered spouse syndrome as a mitigating factor in sentencing.53 The fact 
that the jury rejected the defendant’s claim of self-defense based upon 
evidence of battered spouse syndrome in Whitetail did not preclude the 
District Court from considering battered-spouse-syndrome evidence in 
sentencing.54 Finally, in State v. Pascal,55 the Supreme Court of 
Washington affirmed a ninety-day sentence for first-degree 
manslaughter, a sentence significantly below the Washington state 
sentencing guidelines range.56 The deviation below the sentencing range 
was based in part on evidence in the record that the defendant’s 
experience as a battered woman significantly impaired her ability to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct.57 
Other courts and panels, however, reject battered spouse syndrome 
as a mitigating circumstance during sentencing. For example, in People v. 
 
 47.  State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 219 (1984) (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Tierney, 356 N.J. Super. 468, 480 (App. Div. 2003) (“[A] prolonged course of 
physical abuse by the deceased that the defendant reasonably believed would 
continue might be considered adequate provocation.”). 
 48.  Tierney, 356 N.J. Super. at 480. 
 49.  Kelly, 478 A.2d at 219. 
 50.  205 A.D.2d 344 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  956 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 53.  Id. at 864. 
 54.  Id. at 862–63. 
 55.  736 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1987) (en banc). 
 56.  Id. at 1072–73. 
 57.  Id. at 1071–72. 
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Ambrose,58 the New York intermediate appellate court determined that 
neither the defendant’s emotional disturbance when she shot her 
boyfriend with a rifle in the head, nor her long history of abuse by men, 
demonstrated sufficiently extraordinary circumstances to justify the 
reduction of her prison sentence when the sentencing judge had already 
chosen not to impose a maximum sentence based on other potential 
mitigating factors.59 Remarkably, the New York intermediate appellate 
court is the same court that allowed similar evidence for a sentencing 
reduction just four years later in Johnson. Additionally, in Ex parte 
Haney,60 the Supreme Court of Alabama declined to hold that the 
defendant’s evidence of domestic violence and a battering relationship 
precluded the death penalty.61 This split between, and especially within, 
courts shows that when, why, and how courts accept evidence of 
battered spouse syndrome is inconsistent and that determinative 
patterns are elusive.  
4. Ineffective Counsel and Battered Spouse Syndrome Appeals 
 
Some jurisdictions allow battered defendants to appeal their 
convictions by alleging counsel’s inadequate presentation of battered-
spouse-syndrome evidence at trial.62 For example, a California state 
appellate court accepted an ineffective assistance of counsel argument 
when the defense counsel was unaware of battered spouse syndrome 
and failed to investigate the possibility of proffering evidence of it.63 A 
court in Delaware accepted an argument that defense counsel’s 
inaccurate notions of battered spouse syndrome influenced his advice to 
the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser-included charge.64 In 
Tennessee—in just one case among many—a court found an allegation 
of incompetent representation supportable where the lead defense 
counsel failed to present evidence of battered spouse syndrome after the 
prosecution rested its case, despite the associate defense counselor’s 
opening statement that the jury would hear expert evidence on the 
syndrome.65 Courts have also accepted ineffective assistance of counsel 
 
 58.  160 A.D.2d 1097 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
 59.  Id. at 1097–98. 
 60.  603 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1992). 
 61.  See id. at 418–19 (affirming a death penalty sentence for capital murder 
after the trial court found the evidence to not be mitigating). 
 62.  See, e.g., State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 63.  People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405, 419–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 1992). 
 64.  State v. Scott, Nos. K86-09-0161, K86-09-0162, 1989 WL 90613, at *3–4 
(Del. Super. Ct. July 19, 1989). 
 65.  See, e.g., State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 225–27 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1991). 
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contentions where defense counsel failed to present expert testimony on 
battered spouse syndrome66 and where defense counsel failed to seek a 
jury instruction on battered spouse syndrome after proffering expert 
testimony.67 
Conversely, some courts have rejected ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims involving evidence of battered spouse syndrome when 
counsel has had a good faith basis for including or excluding evidence of 
battered spouse syndrome in trial evidence, or when the defendant 
suffered no prejudice. For example, in Meeks v. Bergen,68 the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
despite defense counsel’s failure to introduce testimony regarding 
battered spouse syndrome.69 Unlike the cases mentioned above, defense 
counsel made a strategic decision to assert a claim of self-defense 
without evidence of battered spouse syndrome, and the facts of the case 
supported a strong self-defense claim.70 Thus, the petitioner did not 
suffer any prejudice.71 And in another case, defense counsel’s failure to 
submit jury instructions on battered spouse syndrome also failed to 
establish incompetent representation because evidence of battered 
spouse syndrome was inconsistent and inappropriate with counsel’s 
alleged defense of “accident.”72 
C. Admission of Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence Through 
Expert and Layperson Testimony 
1. Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence Introduced Through Expert 
Testimony 
 
Evidence establishing the context for understanding battered 
spouse syndrome is traditionally provided by expert testimony. After 
establishing their qualifications, the expert provides testimony 
describing battered spouse syndrome generally.73 In some jurisdictions, 
the expert also describes the extent to which the relationship in question 
demonstrates characteristics typical of battering relationships.74 This 
testimony explains why the defendant behaved as she did given the 
 
 66.  See, e.g., Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 419–20. 
 67.  Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 782 (Pa. 1989). 
 68.  749 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 69.  Id. at 328. But cf. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 419–20. 
 70.  Meeks, 749 F.2d at 328. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  McBrayer v. State, 383 S.E.2d 879, 881–82 (Ga. 1989). But cf. Stonehouse, 
555 A.2d at 784–85. 
 73.  Tinsley, supra note 21, at § 9. 
 74.  Id. 
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circumstances.75 The expert testimony helps the jury understand the case 
from the perspective of the defendant by dispelling myths about women 
in battering relationships.76 For example, the expert testimony may assist 
the jury in understanding that the behavior of the woman and the 
decedent matches behavior commonly exhibited in abusive 
relationships.77 Additionally, expert testimony explains why battered 
defendants may recant testimony, fail to recall details, or seem uncertain 
or unreliable on the witness stand.78 
Experts commonly identify the facts and circumstances that are 
characteristic of battered spouse syndrome. These facts include the 
intimate partner’s extreme jealousy, dominance over the battered 
defendant, gradual change in behavior throughout the course of the 
relationship, and repeated use of physical force against the defendant.79 
Experts explain common features of actual abuse to explain why 
battered women’s conceptions of imminence or provocation may differ 
from those of the average layperson.80 These characteristics can include a 
habit of abuse taking place when the batterer is intoxicated, the trivial 
nature of incidents that can trigger the abuse, and the need for medical 
treatment after prior incidents of abuse.81 Experts also explain factors of 
domestic violence to dispel prior misconceptions about battering 
relationships.82 These components include the defendant’s inability to 
defend herself without using deadly force due to the intimate partner’s 
greater size or her practical inability to leave the family home.83 
Experts explain the similarities between prior beatings and the 
circumstances leading to the defendant’s offense to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s perception of danger and need to use 
deadly force.84 This can include the police’s prior refusal to arrest the 
intimate partner after previous instances of violence, and the 
defendant’s prior futile attempts to defend herself without using deadly 
 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  See, e.g., United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(explaining that expert testimony discussing post-traumatic stress disorders was 
beyond the common knowledge of an average person, and concluding that 
expert testimony assists the jury in understanding why victims do not attempt to 
escape or call for help). 
 77.  Creach, supra note 38. 
 78.  Barnes, supra note 11, at § 2(a) n.19; see also Winters, 729 F.2d at 605. 
 79.  Tinsley, supra note 21, at § 9. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
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force.85 These similarities and circumstances, according to the expert, 
lead the defendant to believe that no other options existed to protect 
herself other than to commit the offense.86 Some experts also offer 
evidence of the intimate partner’s prior relationships, including the use 
of physical force against previous wives or partners, to demonstrate the 
similarities between the circumstances surrounding the abuse of prior 
partners and the defendant.87 
2. The Role of Layperson Testimony 
 
After expert testimony provides relevant context regarding 
battered spouse syndrome, many jurisdictions allow testimony by 
laypersons, including the defendant herself, to provide evidence from 
which the jury can conclude that the defendant suffered from battered 
spouse syndrome as explained by the expert. Testimony from friends, 
neighbors, hospital personnel, or others can help to explain the history 
or characteristics of domestic violence in the specific relationship in 
question.88 Additionally, the testimony may address instances of prior 
abusive behavior in the relationship in question or the defendant’s prior 
failed attempts to obtain help or defend herself.89 
Jurisdictions differ on the admissibility of layperson testimony 
describing domestic violence. For example, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld a District Court’s decision to preclude testimony from 
three lay witnesses and a physician regarding the defendant’s fear of her 
husband and his previous violent behavior when the defendant 
presented insufficient additional evidence of self-defense.90 Conversely, 
courts in other jurisdictions have permitted defendants to provide lay 
testimony about previous abuse by the decedent in support of their self-
defense claims.91 Still another court found that excluding three 
eyewitness laypeople from testifying about the abuse the defendant 
suffered at the time of the offense was not harmless error.92 Although 
the defendant in that case offered expert testimony and did not herself 
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Robinson, supra note 20, at 173. 
 89.  Schneider, supra note 43 at 644–45. 
 90.  Lumpkin v. Ray, 977 F.2d 508, 508–09 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 91.  See, e.g., State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979) (“[T]he defense 
would be entitled, in the event of a retrial, to elicit testimony about the prior 
physical beatings she received in order that the jury may fully evaluate and 
consider the defendant’s mental state at the time of the commission of the 
offense.”). 
 92.  Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1057–58 (Fla. 1999). 
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remember all of the details of the significant events, the court 
determined that “expert testimony . . . does not replace the importance 
of eyewitness testimony to corroborate the offense” when “the excluded 
witnesses would have provided the only direct testimony to support 
[defendant’s] claims of prior abuse.”93 When allowed, this lay testimony 
assists the jury in understanding the defendant’s mental states leading 
up to, and at the time of, the offense.94 
In jurisdictions that admit layperson testimony about the specific 
characteristics of battered spouse syndrome, further variances exist 
regarding whether the layperson testifies before or after the expert. 
Jurisdictions that allow laypersons to testify prior to experts give the 
expert the ability to expand on the meaning of battered spouse 
syndrome, setting a framework that the jury could use to find that the 
relationship in question was one typical of battering relationships.95 
More commonly, however, jurisdictions permit laypersons to testify 
only after expert testimony has been presented. In these jurisdictions, 
the expert defines and contextualizes battered spouse syndrome, after 
which lay witnesses provide evidence that the relationship in question 
demonstrated the characteristics of battered spouse syndrome described 
by the expert.96 Some jurisdictions permit laypersons to testify 
specifically about battered spouse syndrome or generally regarding the 
abusive characteristics of the relationship in question without any expert 
testimony.97 
II. BATTERED-SPOUSE-SYNDROME EVIDENCE IN ALASKA 
There are relatively few cases discussing the evidentiary role of 
battered spouse syndrome in Alaska. Of these cases, even fewer discuss 
battered spouse syndrome in its most common evidentiary context. This 
context involves a battered woman who has allegedly killed or assaulted 
 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See Robinson, supra note 20, at 172 (describing this ordering of testimony 
and the effect it had on the total body of evidence). 
 96.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 633 N.E.2d 1039, 4–7 (Mass. 1994) 
(holding that the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding lay testimony 
regarding the defendant’s prior history of abuse at the hands of the victim and 
excluding expert testimony regarding battered spouse syndrome). 
 97.  See, e.g., Tourlakis v. Morris, 738 F. Supp. 1128, 1140 (S.D. Ohio 1990) 
(holding that the lower court’s decision to preclude expert testimony regarding 
battered spouse syndrome was not a constitutional violation and did not 
amount to prejudicial error when the court permitted the defendant to proffer 
significant lay testimony describing the victim’s previous violent and abusive 
behavior). 
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her spouse proffering evidence of battered spouse syndrome to explain 
her state of mind or to support a self-defense claim. Rather, to articulate 
the nuances of the syndrome, Alaska courts have utilized atypical cases 
where non-battered defendants analogized their situation to those 
involving battered spouse syndrome.  
Section A will detail the sporadic development of battered-spouse-
syndrome jurisprudence in Alaska. This includes the use of evidence of 
battered spouse syndrome to explain a battered woman’s state of mind, 
and to characterize fear, reasonableness, imminence, and provocation in 
light of the battered woman’s situation. This jurisprudence also involves 
the role of battered-spouse-syndrome evidence in supporting a self-
defense claim, as a mitigating factor in sentencing, and in ineffective 
assistance of counsel appeals. Section B will go on to explain the 
parameters under which parties may offer evidence of battered spouse 
syndrome, including through expert testimony and layperson 
testimony. 
A. Development of Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Jurisprudence in 
Alaska 
1. Role of Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence in Relation to Defining 
the Defendant’s State of Mind, Reasonableness, Fear, Imminence, 
and Provocation 
 
Early in Alaska’s battered-spouse-syndrome jurisprudence, the 
state court of appeals acknowledged, but avoided defining, the 
parameters of the admissibility of battered-spouse-syndrome evidence. 
In Halberg v. State,98 the defendant killed her husband, and defended 
against her murder charge by arguing that she stabbed him in self-
defense.99 During her trial, the defendant testified about the domestic 
violence characterizing her relationship with the deceased.100 She 
explained that, on the night of her husband’s death, he “pushed her and 
threatened her, putting her in fear for her life.”101 The defendant 
introduced expert testimony to support her self-defense claim.102 The 
expert witness testified that the defendant’s “history showed that she 
had suffered from battered woman syndrome and that she was 
controlled by her husband.”103 In response, the prosecution offered 
 
 98.  No. A–3733, 1993 WL 13156720 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1993). 
 99.  Id. at *6. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
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evidence rebutting the defendant’s battered-spouse-syndrome evidence 
through testimony about the defendant’s prior assaultive and combative 
actions towards others.104 The judge admitted this evidence under 
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1).105 
The Alaska Court of Appeals declined to explore the “several issues 
concerning the nature of the battered woman syndrome defense and the 
evidentiary effect that raising such a claim has on the normal rules 
governing character evidence.”106 Rather, the court bypassed the issue, 
explaining that, even if the trial court committed error in admitting the 
testimonies, the error was harmless.107 Nonetheless, the court 
acknowledged that the evidentiary role of battered spouse syndrome is 
a complicated subject lacking straightforward answers in Alaska case 
law.108 
Unfortunately, the Alaska courts soon thereafter began to conflate 
the defenses of non-battered defendants with those actually suffering 
from battered spouse syndrome. In Ha v. State,109 the court of appeals 
opined on the role of battered-spouse-syndrome evidence in defining 
imminence in criminal trials by analogizing battered spouse syndrome 
to the decedent’s “reputation for violence and extortion” and recent 
threats of violence.110 In Ha, the trial court articulated an objective test of 
how a reasonably prudent battered woman would perceive the 
aggressor’s demeanor.111 
Although this case itself did not involve a battered spouse, it 
involved the most significant discussion of the evidentiary role of 
battered spouse syndrome to date, using that role as an analogy to the 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. The rule states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible if the sole purpose for offering the evidence is to prove the character 
of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith [but] 
[i]t is, however, admissible for other purposes.” ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
 106.  Halberg, 1993 WL 13156720, at *7. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Cf. Hancock v. State, 706 P.2d 1164, 1166–68 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
Hancock was the first Alaska court of appeals case to use the term “rape trauma 
syndrome.” In Hancock, the state sought permission to offer testimony of social 
workers and mental health care professionals about “rape trauma syndrome” in 
a child sexual assault case where the defendant allegedly assaulted the same 
victim multiple times. Id. at 1166. The social workers testified that “victims of 
sexual abuse act in certain ways, thereby manifesting that they had been 
sexually abused.” Id. The trial court judge ruled that “any testimony about the 
alleged syndrome would not be permitted without a hearing outside the jury’s 
presence.” Id. The appellate court confirmed that the superior court’s actions 
were not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1173–74. 
 109.  892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 110.  Id. at 188. 
 111.  Id. 
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issues explored in the case itself. In Ha, the defendant argued self-
defense.112 But the defense offered no expert testimony; rather, the 
defendant testified about the imminent danger he perceived due to the 
decedent’s allegedly violent nature and history with previous threats 
that turned deadly.113 The court expressed hesitation with the 
defendant’s depiction of imminence, since the killing happened the day 
after the threat and fear-inducing altercation between the two men.114 In 
response, the defendant’s attorney analogized the present case to cases 
involving battered spouse syndrome.115 The attorney argued, “in cases 
where battered women shot their husbands while they slept, courts had 
ruled that the trial juries should receive instructions on self-defense.”116 
The defense attorney reasoned that “the fact that [the victim] was shot 
from behind is irrelevant, just like the fact that a husband is shot while 
he’s asleep.”117 The important issue was whether the defendant felt like 
he was in imminent fear for his own safety.118 The court noted that the 
defense counsel’s statement inaccurately characterized current law, as 
the majority of jurisdictions did not permit a self-defense instruction 
when a woman killed her sleeping abusive spouse, and refused to 
instruct the jury on self-defense.119 
In rejecting the self-defense instruction, the Ha court discussed two 
cases to substantiate its conclusion that a trial judge can reject self-
defense instructions when no evidence of imminent threat of harm 
exists.120 The first case, Paul v. State,121 is discussed below in Part II.A.2. 
The second case, State v. Stewart,122 dealt with a battered woman who 
killed her sleeping husband.123 There, the Kansas Supreme Court held: 
Because of prior history of abuse, and the difference in strength 
and size between the abused and the abuser, the accused in 
such cases may choose to defend during a momentary lull in 
the abuse, rather than during [an active] conflict . . . . However, 
in order to warrant the giving of a self-defense instruction, the 
facts of the case must still show that the spouse was in 
 
 112.  Id. at 185. 
 113.  Id. at 188–89. 
 114.  Id. at 188. 
 115.  Id. at 188–89. 
 116.  Id. at 189. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 195-96. 
 120.  Id. at 191–92. 
 121.  655 P.2d 772 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 122.  763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988). 
 123.  Id. at 574. 
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imminent danger close to the time of the killing.124 
The Ha opinion explained that the Kansas court found evidence of 
prior abuse and a woman’s knowledge of her husband’s propensity for 
violence relevant to demonstrate that the husband’s conduct on the 
particular occasion in question indicated the immediacy of another 
abusive episode.125 The Kansas court also stated that “in cases involving 
battered spouses, the objective test is how a reasonably prudent battered 
wife would perceive the aggressor’s demeanor.”126 However, the Kansas 
court ultimately decided that a battered woman who kills her sleeping 
spouse does not merit a self-defense instruction because the danger is 
not immediate or reasonably necessary.127 The Ha court applied the 
Kansas court’s reasoning and rejected the self-defense instruction 
because the defense failed to demonstrate imminence. 
Alaska courts have also resisted permitting evidence of battered 
spouse syndrome when it distracts from other issues or fails to 
meaningfully assist the jury. In Woods v. State,128 a police officer 
attempted to test the defendant’s blood-alcohol level because he 
suspected her of driving under the influence of alcohol (DWI).129 
However, the defendant became “upset and started crying, screaming, 
and cursing . . . and kicked back at [the officer] several times, striking 
him in the legs,” and “remained hysterical during the entire DWI 
processing.”130 The defendant attempted to call two experts131 to testify 
that it is common for women victimized by domestic violence to be 
hostile to the police when they believe law enforcement have not 
assisted or helped in the past.132 The court denied both requests.133 The 
judge refused to admit the evidence of battered spouse syndrome 
because it was too attenuated and distracting from the actual issues at 
hand, and would not have assisted the jury in any meaningful way.134 
 
 
 124.  Id. at 577 (citation omitted), quoted in Ha, 892 P.2d at 192. 
 125.  Ha, 892 P.2d at 192. 
 126. Stewart, 763 P.2d at 579 (emphasis added), quoted in Ha, 892 P.2d at 192 
(emphasis added). 
 127.  Ha, 892 P.2d at 192. 
 128.  No. A–6853, 1999 WL 189664 (Alaska Ct. App. April 7, 1999). 
 129.  Id. at *1. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at *2. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at *3. 
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2. Role of Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence in Alaskan Self-Defense 
Claims 
 
Alaska courts primarily have discussed the role of battered-spouse 
syndrome-evidence in self-defense claims through analogies. Courts 
compare typical cases, such as when the defendant killed her abusive 
spouse out of fear of grave bodily injury in an episode of domestic 
violence, to other types of cases involving similar cycles of fear and 
abuse. The Alaska court system’s first discussion of the relation of 
battered-spouse-syndrome evidence to self-defense claims was in a 
footnote in Paul.135 In that case, a man killed his brother after an 
altercation.136 At trial, the defendant testified that violence marred the 
brothers’ relationship.137 On the evening of the crime, the defendant told 
a witness, “[h]e hits me all the time.”138 
In the footnote, the court opined about the intersection between 
self-defense and its imminence requirement by using “battered wife 
syndrome” as an example.139 The Court explained: 
This is not to say that self-defense instructions cannot be 
rejected by the court when there is some evidence that the 
defendant acted to defend himself, but no evidence of 
imminent peril. An example of circumstances under which self-
defense instructions might be denied based on lack of 
imminent peril may be found in “battered wife syndrome” 
homicides. Typically, these cases involve a battered wife who 
kills her husband in his sleep. Although in such instances there 
is commonly ample evidence to support a finding that the 
killing was motivated by fear and that the fear may have been 
as real and as urgent at the time of the killing as it was when 
the husband was awake and actually capable of immediate 
physical abuse, cases have uniformly refused to apply self-
defense to this category of crime. The basis for refusal has been 
lack of an immediate threat of harm.140 
The state attempted to analogize the case at hand to cases involving 
evidence of battered spouse syndrome.141 However, the court found this 
 
 135.  655 P.2d 772, 778 n.8 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 136.  Id. at 773–75. 
 137.  Id. at 774. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 778 n.8. 
 140.  Id. (citing Doris Del Tosto, Comment, The Battered Spouse Syndrome as a 
Defense to a Homicide Charge Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 26 VILL. L. REV. 
105, 132–33 (1980)). 
 141.  Id. 
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comparison inappropriate.142 The court explained that in cases 
incorporating evidence of battered spouse syndrome, uncontroverted 
facts established a lack of imminent danger, rendering instructions on 
self-defense inappropriate.143 Conversely, in Paul, the defense presented 
some evidence of imminent danger.144 Thus, the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s belief necessitated evaluation by the jury.145 
Despite eventually allowing admission of the evidence, the Paul 
court reached several erroneous conclusions in its evaluation and 
application of the role of battered spouse syndrome to the circumstances 
before it. First, the court mistakenly assumed that cases “uniformly 
refused”146 to issue instructions on self-defense when battered women 
kill their intimate partners in their sleep, despite the absence of Alaska 
case law discussing the matter and variance in the case law between 
other jurisdictions. Some courts, for example, have held that “[o]ften the 
terror does not wane, even when the batterer is absent or asleep.”147 
Thus, when “torture appears interminable and escape impossible, the 
belief that only the death of the batterer can provide relief may be 
reasonable in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.”148 Second, the 
court inaccurately characterized the role of battered-spouse-syndrome 
evidence in defining imminence.149 In many cases involving evidence of 
battered spouse syndrome, uncontroverted facts do not establish a lack 
of imminent danger as stated by the court.150 Rather, the facts of the case 
and the woman’s status as a battered woman redefine her 
understanding of imminence in the context of the alleged offense.151 
Additionally, determining whether the parties provided sufficient 
evidence of imminence, or the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief 
of imminence in the circumstances, necessitates evaluation by the jury in 
cases involving evidence of battered spouse syndrome.152 
 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. But this is an incorrect statement of the law. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 144.  Paul, 655 P.2d at 778 n.8. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Robinson v. State, 417 S.E.2d 88, 91 (S.C. 1992). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See Paul, 655 P.2d at 778 n.8 (“In the cases dealing with ‘battered wife 
syndrome’ killings, the uncontroverted facts establish the lack of any immediate 
danger, hence justifying refusal to instruct on self defense.”). 
 150.  See supra text accompanying notes 120–34. 
 151.  See supra text accompanying notes 120–34. 
 152.  See supra text accompanying notes 120–34. 
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3. Role of Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence as a Mitigating Factor 
in Sentencing 
 
Unlike for self-defense claims, Alaska courts do admit evidence of 
battered spouse syndrome as a mitigating factor in determining an 
appropriate sentence. Although the Alaska Supreme Court did not use 
“battered spouse syndrome” by name, it first utilized expert testimony 
regarding domestic violence causing an altered perception in Ripley v. 
State.153 There, the lower court convicted the defendant of killing her ex-
live-in boyfriend.154 The defendant appealed, arguing her sentence was 
excessive “in light of the tragic circumstances of this case” and that this 
evidence should have played a role in sentencing.155 
The defendant provided expert testimony from a psychiatrist to 
explain that the defendant “felt herself to be in real physical danger” 
and that her ability to perceive such danger did not differ from that of a 
“normal person.”156 The expert then offered testimony applying the 
 
 153.  590 P.2d 48 (Alaska 1979). 
 154.  Id. at 49. 
 155.  Id. at 52. 
 156.  Id. at 52–53. Portions of the psychiatric evaluation were admitted at trial 
and included in Footnote 8 of the opinion, which states: 
Suffice it to say for this report that Mrs. Ripley felt herself to be in real 
physical danger due to threats made directly to her from Mr. Lucas [the 
decedent] and from her perception that Mr. Lucas was a dangerous 
man and had a past history of having been involved in a homicide. 
There is evidence that she was in great fear over the safety of her minor 
children and had . . . severely limited the activities of her children. 
There is the clear history of a snowballing of threats and fear with signs 
of the development of a severe anxiety/fear state. This state is 
characterized by the continued perception of physical danger, the 
physical concomitants of anxiety including motor agitation, emotional 
liability, frequent crying episodes, poor sleep pattern, poor appetite, 
etc. There is also some history of emotional overreactiveness like the 
call to the Anchorage police on November 3, 1976 when the whole 
family heard “someone crawling under the trailer.” . . . Examples which 
demonstrate the presence of the anxiety/fear state in Mrs. Ripley are 
extremely plentiful. In summary, prior to the shooting, and building in 
intensity up to the time of the shooting, Mrs. Ripley was suffering from 
increasing anxiety/fear based on her perception of the threats made 
upon her life. Further, in summary, her ability to perceive would not be 
that divergent from the “normal person”, there being no serious 
distortion in her ability to perceive her environment due to mental 
disorder. . . . As I have said above Mrs. Ripley’s perceptions may have 
very well been those of the normal person placed in a situation of threat 
and may be more accurately placed in the area of a fear reaction. This is 
not a mental disorder. My own understanding of the situation would 
be along the lines of a fear reaction to a real threat. 
Id. at 53 n.8 (third ellipsis in original). 
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contours of altered perceptions due to ongoing violence generally to the 
specific defendant.157 The psychiatrist explained that the defendant 
“lived in fear” that her abuser and victim “might attempt to kill her and 
her children” and that “[h]er fear was based upon his expressed intent 
to kill her or have her killed.”158 In discussing the deterrent effect of 
sentences, the Alaska Supreme Court explained that the psychiatric 
report evidenced the defendant’s perception of imminent danger of 
death or seriously bodily injury.159 Ultimately, the court concluded that 
the specific facts of this case, including the defendant’s perception of 
danger, necessitated lowering the sentence from three years of 
incarceration down to one year.160 
B. Admission of Battered-Spouse-Syndrome Evidence in Alaska 
1. Expert Testimony 
 
Alaska, like the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, 
permits defendants to offer expert testimony regarding battered spouse 
syndrome when the defendant assaulted or killed her allegedly abusive 
intimate partner. Furthermore, Alaska is one of over twenty states 
accepting some form of expert testimony regarding battered spouse 
syndrome from prosecutors in cases where the battered spouse is not the 
criminal defendant.161 
In a series of cases, the Alaska courts defined the credentials 
necessary for testifying experts and the parameters for appropriate 
testimony regarding trauma-related syndromes. In Rodriquez v. State,162 a 
child sexual-abuse case, the court discussed the logistics of “presenting a 
witness who can state that the behavior of a [defendant] falls within a 
common pattern.”163 The court explained that expert testimony using 
scientific principles to establish “that another witness is telling the truth 
treads on dangerous legal ground.”164 Conversely, expert witness 
testimony “provid[ing] useful background information to aid the jury in 
 
 157.  Id. at 53 n.8. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 54. 
 160.  Id. at 55. But see Ambrose v. State, No. A–5112, 1996 WL 341743 (Alaska 
Ct. App. May 22, 1996) (considering and rejecting a similar defense because the 
record indicated that the defendant acted out of anger rather than out of fear). 
 161.  Jessica N. Heaven, Battered Woman Syndrome, 9 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 593, 
599 (2008). 
 162.  741 P.2d 1200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). 
 163.  Id. at 1204. 
 164.  Id. 
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evaluating the testimony of another witness is admissible.”165 The court 
found that, because of the expert’s significant credentials and experience 
in a relevant field as a social worker, the expert’s testimony describing 
common characteristics among sexually exploited children was 
admissible as falling under the latter category.166 
The court later clarified the standard articulated in Rodriquez in 
Anderson v. State,167 holding that expert testimony is appropriate to 
demonstrate that members of a relevant class often exhibit certain 
characteristics that are otherwise unexpected of victims of abuse, despite 
having in fact suffered from abuse. In Anderson, another child sexual-
abuse case, a doctor who never met or examined the victims testified at 
trial.168 The expert’s testimony “was limited to identifying certain 
behavioral characteristics that mental health professionals associate with 
victims of sexual abuse.”169 The court in Anderson recognized that the 
Rodriquez court described how expert testimony is offered for multiple 
purposes, and concluded that formulating one rule to cover all 
circumstances for expert testimony would be difficult.170 However, the 
court identified one situation in which expert testimony is consistently 
appropriate: 
When a complaining witness testifies that he or she has been 
the subject of sexual or physical abuse and the defense seeks to 
discredit this testimony by showing that the witness’ conduct 
(i.e., remaining with the allegedly abusive partner or parent or 
expressing love or affection for that allegedly abusing person) 
was inconsistent with the claimed abuse and therefore that the 
claim of abuse was false, the state should be permitted to offer 
expert testimony that other members of the relevant class (i.e., 
abused or battered women or sexually abused children) 
characteristically exhibit such conduct even though they are, in 
fact, abused.171 
The Anderson court left the door open for future courts to define further 
parameters regarding the subjects and situations in which expert 
testimony may be permitted. 
While expert testimony is appropriate in some circumstances, 
 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 1204–05. 
 167.  749 P.2d 369 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. § 
11.81.900(b)(52), as recognized by Boeggess v. State, 783 P.2d 1173 (1989). 
 168.  Id. at 373. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
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experts in Alaska must testify only about battered spouse syndrome 
generally, and may not opine on whether the defendant herself is a 
member of a specific group by comparing the defendant’s characteristics 
to that of a larger group. The Anderson court explained that Alaska 
courts are “critical of testimony suggesting that children never lie about 
sexual abuse.”172 Additionally, Alaska courts “never authorized expert 
testimony seeking to establish that a person is a member of a class or 
group, i.e., battered women or sexually abused children, by showing 
that they exhibit behavioral characteristics common to that group.”173 
However, in Haakanson v. State,174 the Alaska Court of Appeals read 
Rodriquez and Anderson together to “permit expert testimony that 
responds to a defense claim that a complaining witness’ conduct is 
inconsistent with being sexually abused by showing that similar conduct 
is exhibited by those who are sexually abused.”175 However, the cases 
“do not permit testimony offered to prove that the complaining witness 
is sexually abused by showing that the complaining witness exhibits 
behavior similar to that exhibited by sexually abused children.”176 
A few months after the Haakanson decision, this reasoning was 
applied to an adult sexual-assault case. In Hilburn v. State,177 the court of 
appeals held that an expert may properly testify that the withdrawn 
behavior of an Alaska Native woman who was the victim of repeated 
sexual assaults from the same man is consistent with that of an Alaska 
Native woman from a village having undergone a traumatic 
experience.178 This testimony demonstrated that the victim’s conduct 
was that of a reasonable person in the scenario.179 
When the victim, rather than the defendant, demonstrates 
characteristics of battered spouse syndrome, evidence of battered spouse 
syndrome may not be offered as an offensive weapon. Rather, experts 
may testify about the syndrome only as a response to a defendant’s 
claim that the victim’s behavior was inconsistent with that of an abuse 
victim. In Russell v. State (Russell I),180 the defendant-husband was 
charged with raping his estranged wife.181 The victimized woman 
offered a doctor’s expert testimony diagnosing her with battered spouse 
 
 172.  Id. (citing Colgan v. State, 711 P.2d 533 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)). 
 173.  Id. at 373. 
 174.  760 P.2d 1030 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
 175.  Id. at 1036. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  765 P.2d 1382 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
 178.  Id. at 1385. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  934 P.2d 1335 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (Russell I). 
 181.  Id. at 1339. 
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syndrome, and the court found that evidence admissible.182 
The expert used the battered spouse syndrome framework to 
counter the defendant’s allegations that the victim’s behavior following 
the alleged incident was inconsistent with the behavior of a raped 
woman by applying the traits of battered women generally to the victim 
specifically.183 The defendant argued that the expert testimony 
diagnosing the victim as a battered woman “improperly vouched for 
[the victim’s] credibility.”184 The court interpreted its case law as 
prohibiting introducing “evidence that there is a psychological ‘profile’ 
characteristic of sexual abuse [victims] . . . to prove that the victim in a 
particular case fits the profile, and thus that the victim must be telling 
the truth. . . .”185 However, previous courts had permitted “profile” 
testimony “in response to a defense claim that the victim’s conduct was 
inconsistent with a claim of . . . sexual abuse.”186 The expert testimony in 
Russell I fell in the latter category.187 Thus, the court permitted the state 
to introduce the evidence.188 
Nevertheless, in Russell v. State (Russell II),189 which reexamined the 
case on an appeal claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, the Alaska 
Court of Appeals revisited its original understanding of the general role 
of expert testimony in offering evidence of battered spouse syndrome.190 
The court clarified that experts may only explain the syndrome, and 
may not identify a particular party as exhibiting characteristics of 
battered spouse syndrome.191 The unpublished opinion explained that at 
the close of the expert’s voir dire, the judge reiterated that the expert 
may “describe battered woman syndrome,” but may neither “draw 
specific parallels between [the victim’s] behavior and any conclusion 
that a crime had occurred,” nor “say that his diagnosis of battered 
woman syndrome made [the victim’s] account of what happened or her 
explanation of events any more true or credible.”192 
 
 182.  Id. at 1343. 
 183.  Russell I, 934 P.2d at 1343–44. 
 184.  Id. at 1343. To support this contention, the defendant cited Haakanson v. 
State, 760 P.2d 1030 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), and Cox v. State, 805 P.2d 374 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1991), which found psychological “profile” evidence against male 
defendants of sexual assault to be impermissible. Russell I, 934 P.2d at 1343. 
 185.  Russell I, 934 P.2d at 1343. 
 186.  Id.; see also Haakanson, 760 P.2d at 1036 (stating that such testimony is 
allowed if first raised by the defendant). 
 187.  Russell I, 934 P.2d at 1343. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  No. A–7618, 2002 WL 31667313 (Alaska Ct. App. November 27, 2002) 
(Russell II). 
 190.  Id. at *1. 
 191.  Id. at *18–20. 
 192.  Id. at *19. 
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2. Layperson Testimony 
 
Alaska courts distinguish between the roles of expert testimony 
and lay testimony, but ultimately permit parties to offer both as 
evidence of battered spouse syndrome. 
Alaska courts permit the use of layperson testimony to discuss the 
history of domestic violence in the specific relationship to support 
expert testimony that offers only a general explanation of battered 
spouse syndrome. For example, in Anderson, lay witnesses testified that 
the child-victims “manifested some of the behavioral characteristics” of 
abused children previously described by a doctor in his expert 
testimony.193 These lay witnesses included parents of other children at 
the child’s day care.194 Additionally, in Russell I, the court permitted the 
rape victim to offer evidence of the abuser-defendant’s prior physical 
abuse to explain why she did not physically resist the defendant during 
the rape.195 Before trial, the defendant asked the Superior Court to bar 
the state from introducing evidence of his prior physical abuse from 
when he was married to the victim.196 The defendant argued that Alaska 
Rule of Evidence 404(b)197 barred the evidence because it would add no 
value other than painting the defendant as an abusive husband.198 
However, the court admitted this evidence to explain the relationship 
between the two people.199 In particular, the court found the evidence 
useful in assisting the jury to understand why one person may fear 
another person or submit to another person’s will.200 The court also 
explained that courts employ the same rationale to admit evidence of a 
victim’s bad acts when a defendant is charged with assault or homicide 
and proffers a self-defense claim in response.201 In deciding whether a 
defendant acted reasonably in using force upon their victim, the 
defendant may “introduce evidence that he was aware of the victim’s 
 
 193.  749 P.2d 369, 373 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), superseded by statute, ALASKA 
STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(52), as recognized by Boeggess v. State, 783 P.2d 1173 (1989). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  934 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 196.  Id. at 1340–41. 
 197.  This rule states that evidence of prior bad acts “is not admissible if the 
sole purpose for offering the evidence is to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” ALASKA R. EVID. 
404(b). However, evidence of prior bad acts is permitted under the rule if its 
purpose is to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. 
 198.  Russell I, 934 P.2d at 1340. 
 199.  Id. at 1341. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
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past acts of violence.”202 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR AN APPROACH TO THE ADMISSION OF 
BATTERED-SPOUSE-SYNDROME EVIDENCE IN ALASKA 
A. Battered Spouse Syndrome in Alaska Today: More Questions 
than Answers 
Alaska has no binding case law or statutes regarding the 
admissibility of battered-spouse-syndrome evidence, and appellate 
opinions on the topic are sparse, incomplete, and inconsistent with each 
other. There have been no easily available appellate opinions (whether 
termed “published” or “unpublished”) discussing battered spouse 
syndrome in Alaska since Russell II203 in 2002. Moreover, many of the 
published opinions before then demonstrate that evidence of battered 
spouse syndrome has been used against abuser-defendants, rather than 
for battered defendants charged with offenses against their abusers.204 
However, case law remains unclear regarding avenues for battered 
women as defendants for crimes allegedly committed against abusers. 
The absence of binding precedent, coupled with high rates of 
domestic violence in Alaska and battered spouse syndrome’s varied 
evidentiary uses in Alaska courts of appeals, suggests that Alaska 
jurisprudence would benefit from a clearer rule discussing the 
admissibility of battered-spouse-syndrome evidence. Most other states 
have these clear rules and case law.205 Some of these rules are 
independent statutes governing battered-spouse-syndrome evidence, 
and others are incorporated into general evidentiary rules regarding 
expert testimony.206 
B. Proposed Framework 
1. Define “Reasonableness” to Include a “Reasonable “Battered 
Woman” 
 
Alaska should interpret “reasonableness” to include a “reasonable 
 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  No. A–7618, 2002 WL 31667313 (Alaska Ct. App. November 27, 2002). 
 204.  See generally, Russell I, 934 P.2d 1335. 
 205.  See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for 
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 
(1993) (providing a comprehensive survey of case law and statutes in all fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico). 
 206.  Id. 
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battered woman” standard when the relevant party has been battered 
and claims an altered perception or extreme emotional disturbance as a 
result. This “reasonable battered woman” standard could mirror the 
standard used by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Thomas.207 Under 
this standard, the jury first objectively considers whether the defendant, 
in her situation and in light of her personal characteristics, reasonably 
believed danger was imminent.208 Then, the jury determines whether the 
particular defendant had a genuine belief that she faced imminent 
danger.209 The woman’s experience as a battered woman suffering from 
battered spouse syndrome makes her perception of the situation 
different than a woman who has not been battered. Therefore, the 
consequences of the abuse inform and define the reasonable person 
against whom she is judged. The Supreme Court of North Dakota 
provided another explanation of this standard when it held that, in cases 
involving battered defendants, “conduct is not to be judged by what a 
reasonably cautious person might . . . consider necessary[,] . . . but what 
he himself in good faith honestly believed and had reasonable ground to 
believe was necessary for him to do to protect himself.”210 The battered 
defendant’s actions “are to be viewed from the standpoint of a person 
whose mental and physical characteristics are like the accused’s.”211 The 
role of expert testimony in this analysis would be to allow the jury to 
better understand battered spouse syndrome.  
2. The Role Of Expert And Layperson Testimony 
 
Alaskan jurisprudence is fairly consistent regarding the role of 
expert testimony. However, due to the absence of statutes or Alaska 
supreme court case law discussing the use of testimony in battered 
spouse syndrome contexts, Alaska should codify or formalize its 
existing practices regarding the role and permissibility of expert and 
layperson testimony regarding battered spouse syndrome. First, experts 
should be allowed to describe battered spouse syndrome generally to 
provide a psychological context, dispel myths about women in battering 
relationships regarding why women stay or may fail to recall details of 
the incident, and provide a new framework through which the jury 
views the case.  There is no need for formality with regard to expert 
witnesses. They are qualified based on “knowledge, skill, experience, 
 
 207.  77 Ohio St. 3d 323, 330–31 (1997). 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (quoting State v. 
Hazlett, 113 N.W. 374, 380 (N.D. 1907)). 
 211.  Id. 
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training, or education,” and their usefulness is based on whether the 
fact-finder or jury “can receive appreciable help” from the expert,  and 
“whether the witness’s opinion rests on specialized knowledge that is 
likely not shared by the jury.”  This means that there is no need for the 
expert to be licensed in the state of Alaska or hold an advanced degree.  
For example, a police officer could testify as an expert in a case 
pertaining to sexual assault and tampering with evidence of domestic 
violence if they have received training in the investigation of domestic 
violence.  
After expert testimony is offered, laypeople should be allowed to 
provide evidence that the specific party in the case was battered and that 
she exhibits the characteristics of battered individuals as explained by 
the expert. This evidence may include past instances of abuse or 
domestic violence. For example, Florida courts permit layperson 
testimony because “expert testimony about domestic violence . . . does 
not replace the value of eyewitness testimony to corroborate the claim of 
prior acts of abuse.”  The battered woman herself should also be allowed 
to testify about her experiences as a layperson. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the high rates of domestic violence in Alaska, Alaska 
jurisprudence affords battered women varying and sparse guidance on 
the admissibility of evidence of their experience as a battered woman in 
criminal trials. Of the minimal guidance offered, none arises in the form 
of a binding Alaska Supreme Court opinion, rule of evidence, or 
governing statute. As one of the few states lacking clear jurisprudence 
on evidence of battered spouse syndrome, Alaska would benefit from a 
clearer rule discussing the role of battered-spouse-syndrome evidence. 
